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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




Appellant Scott Capps challenges the District Court’s imposition of a 48-month 
sentence following this Court’s remand for resentencing in relation to his convictions for 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud, money laundering, and filing a false tax return.  See 
United States v. Capps, 977 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2020).  At resentencing, the District 
Court reduced the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range but imposed the same sentence 
as before, which remained below the revised range.  Capps argues on appeal that it was 
procedurally unreasonable to reimpose that sentence.  Because the District Court 
meaningfully considered Capps’s sentencing arguments and all relevant factors under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), it committed no procedural error and we will affirm its sentence.1 
I. Discussion 
When imposing a sentence, a district court must (1) “calculate a defendant’s 
Guidelines [range] precisely,” (2) “formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] 
on the record whether [it is] granting a departure and how that departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation,” and, ultimately, (3) “exercise[] [its] discretion by considering the 
relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (second, third, fifth, and seventh alterations in original) (citation omitted).  
While the District Court’s consideration of these factors need not include explicit findings, 
its analysis “must adequately demonstrate its exercise of ‘independent judgment’ and 
meaningful consideration of the relevant sentencing factors” and any “colorable 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 





argument[s] about the[ir] applicability” raised by the parties.  United States v. Merced, 603 
F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Capps claims that the District Court, in 
carrying out this final step, committed two procedural errors, and because he failed to 
object at sentencing, we review for plain error.2   
But Capps cannot show error, much less plain error.  First, he contends that the 
District Court misconstrued its discretion to vary from its original sentence, thereby failing 
to meaningfully consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a).  But that assertion is belied by 
the record.  Far from proceeding as if “bound to consider the original sentence,” or the 
erroneous Guidelines calculation, Appellant Br. 12, the Court went “back over the original 
record and the record for [the resentencing] hearing,” JA 148, and concluded that the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors presented no “need . . . to change the sentence,” JA 150.  Using 
the new Guidelines range and the “sentencing protocols established by [them],” JA 149, as 
the “starting point and . . . initial benchmark,” for its analysis, Molina-Martinez v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (citation omitted), the District Court again imposed a 
below-range sentence.  In light of the Court’s lengthy and “meaningful consideration” of 
the sentencing factors, Merced, 603 F.3d at 215, we are satisfied it did not misconstrue its 
discretion at step three of the sentencing process. 
 
2 To establish plain error, Capps “must show that there is ‘(1) an error; (2) that is 
plain; [and] (3) that affects substantial rights.’”  United States v. Poulson, 871 F.3d 261, 
270 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).  Once those conditions have been met, this Court 
may “exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Rosales-Mireles v. United 




Neither can Capps prevail on his contention that the District Court did not 
acknowledge or address his argument for a downward variance based on post-sentencing 
rehabilitation.  Capps argued that “he ha[d] proven his redemption,” JA 144, in prison by 
taking “opportunities to self-reflect and permanently change his past . . . problematic 
thinking and behavior patterns,” JA 143–44, and on that basis, he requested a sentence of 
time served.  In response, the Court observed that Capps had “acknowledged that he made 
a terrible mistake,” and had persuaded the Court that “his future life will not include any 
criminal conduct.”  JA 149.  Considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, however, including 
“the seriousness of the offense, . . . respect for the law, and [the need to] provide just 
punishment,” JA 149, the Court concluded “that [a] time served sentence would [not] 
accomplish any of those goals,” JA 149–50.  The Court thus engaged with the substance 
of Capps’s request.  
In short, the sentencing judge “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he 
has considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own 
legal decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  Because 
the District Court did not err in its “exercise of discretion” and “meaningful consideration 
of the relevant sentencing factors,” Merced, 603 F.3d at 215 (citation omitted), we conclude 
that Capps’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. 
II. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
